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GIARRATANO v. MURRAY
847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988)
In Giarratano v. Murray, a class action suit initiated by
Virginia death row inmates, the Fourth Circuit Court ruled that
meaningful access to courts, for indigent death sentenced
prisoners only, requires Virginia to appoint counsel to assist in
state habeas corpus actions.
Legal assistance to death-row inmates in Virginia is currently
provided by center-maintained law libraries, unit attorneys and
attorneys appointed under Va. Code §14.1-183 (after a petition
is filed and then only if a nonfrivolous claim is raised). 847
F.2d at 1119-1120. Virginia Code §§ 19.2-157 and 19.2-159
identify the duty of the trial court to appoint counsel and
define indigency. Under Giarratano, Virginia is required to ap-
point counsel before an inmate has filed his state habeas corpus
petition; however, appointment of counsel is limited to state
habeas corpus proceedings and does not extend to either peti-
tions for writs of certiorari or federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
The Court upheld on review the district court's "well
reasoned opinion" which found that "legal assistance presently
available to Virginia death row inmates in state post-conviction
proceedings fails to meet the Constitutional requirement of
meaningful access to the courts as set fourth in Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (requiring prison authorities to assist
inmates in preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing adequate law libraries or assistance from legally train-
ed personnel)." 847 F.2d at 1121.
In a majority opinion by Circuit Judge Hall, the Court re-
jected the State's argument based on Pennsylvania v. Finley,
_ U.S. , 107 S.Ct 1990 (1987), that there is no
Constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings. 847 F.2d at 1121. The Court distinguished the case on
several grounds. "Finley was not a meaningful access case, nor
did it address the rule enunciated in Bounds v. Smith. Most
significantly, Finley did not involve the death penalty." Id., at
1122. Citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (where the
court found that there is a "significant Constitutional difference
between the death penalty and lesser punishments"), Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1982) (where the court required "no
less stringent standards than those demanded in any other
aspect of a capital proceeding"), and Booth v. Maryland,
_ U.S. .. 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987) ("death is a punish-
ment different from all other sanctions"), the Court refused to
"read Finley as suggesting that the counsel cannot be required
under the unique circumstances of post-conviction proceedings
involving a challenge to the death penalty." 847 F.2d at 1122.
The Fourth Circuit denied any Constitutional basis for
automatic appointment of counsel to death row inmates in
federal post-conviction proceedings. 847 F.2d at 1122. Citing
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (Supreme Court rejected
claim that states must appoint counsel for indigents seeking a
writ of certiorari), the court found Virginia's provision of
counsel at state post-conviction proceedings, which provides
briefs, transcripts and opinions to use in their federal habeas
corpus proceedings, satisfies the meaningful access requirement
of Bounds. 847 F.2d at 1122.
Circuit Judge Wilkins, in dissent, objected to this decision
on two grounds: 1) it establishes "a right to appointed counsel
where none is required by the Constitution" (Id., at 1125), and
2) it exemplifies judicial policy-making in one of its worst cases
(Id., at 1124).
The United States Supreme Court granted Virginia's petition
for certiorari on October 31, 1988.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The decision was not grounded in a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel at state habeas, though at present, the result is func-
tionally the same-a requirement that counsel be appointed.
The difference in Constitutional basis theoretically leaves open
to Virginia the option of fashioning meaningful access without
counsel. The court here just ruled that the present system does
not provide that. (Helen Bishop)
